Reflections On My Small Part in the Battle of Dai Do Village
Republic of South Vietnam
April 20-May 4, 1968

by

Herman W. Hughes
CAPTAIN USNR (RET)

 My tour of duty in the combat zone of the Republic of South Vietnam began on April 12, 1968 when I arrived in Saigon.  After five days of orientation at Headquarters, MACV, I departed for the northernmost U. S. military post in South Vietnam, located on a spit of sand at the mouth of the Cua Viet river.  Dong Ha was just a short distance upriver.

CUA VIET Navy and Marine Corps base as seen from the door of a HUEY helicopter 

I was assigned to CTF 543, Task Force Clearwater, to serve as Intelligence Officer.  By the time I arrived at Cua Viet I was an experienced intelligence specialist (officer designator 1635).  I had 6 years of experience in intelligence work and training in Washington, DC,  in Japan, and at the U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

 Task Force Clearwater provided security on the Cua Viet River and the Perfume River utilizing various types of river patrol craft, most common of which was the PBR (Patrol Boat River).  Task Force Clearwater also had two huge Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles located on the Perfume River downriver from Hue.

 
RIVER PATROL BOAT (PBR)

 During my three months at Cua Viet, I participated in numerous patrols on the rivers, in the air and on land with the Navy, the Marine Corps and South Vietnamese Navy (Junk Force).

 
South Vietnamese Navy Junk

LT Herman Hughes, US Navy on patrol with Marines north of Cua Viet River (April 1968)

 Late April 1968 began one of the most rewarding periods of my naval career.  On 24 April I went on a night patrol on a river patrol boat up the river toward Dong Ha.  We spotted two unidentified swimmers in the water but were unable to engage them.  This was but one of numerous indicators that something big was about to happen on the river. 

Earlier our little base had begun receiving intense bombardment by North Vietnamese artillery - 85 mm, 122 mm, and the really big ones, 152 mm.  These attacks usually occurred at night.  The attacks resulted in 6 killed and 23 wounded in a little over two months.  

Artillery hit our office hooch.                      And destroyed our new mess hall.

 I reported these attacks by Flash precedence message to Navy headquarters in Saigon stating that we were being hit by heavy artillery. Unfortunately, without physical evidence or corroborating evidence, my reports received little attention.  In fact, the only answer I got was the speculation that we were being hit by rockets, not artillery.   If we were being hit by artillery, that would mean that the NVA would have to have moved artillery pieces into the DMZ and that, by definition, was forbidden, so the reasoning went.  Therefore, we couldn’t have been hit by artillery fire.

 After one night attack, an unexploded 152mm artillery round was discovered embedded in the hardpan of our loading area.  The Explosive Ordnance Demolition team placed shaped charges on the round and exploded it.  I recovered the pieces and put them together like a jigsaw puzzle.  Fortunately, the pieces were rather large and easily assembled.  I asked my boss for permission to take it to Saigon.  He gave me permission and allowed me to take along another man to help carry the heavy round which I had placed in a wooden box.

We hitched a ride on a cargo ship to DaNang and caught a ride on a Marine C130 to Saigon.  We marched into Commander Naval Forces Vietnam offices and placed the round on the desk of the intelligence officer.  I said something to the effect that here was proof of what we were being hit with.  He stared in disbelief at the huge round on his nice

EOD Divers at Cua Viet

 Late on May 5, I received word that the Marines had captured a North Vietnamese sailor that I might be interested in.  I traveled to Dong Ha and interrogated the man.  He revealed that he had been a member of a North Vietnam Navy special forces team sent across the DMZ to emplace mines in the Cua Viet River. 

 The following day I returned to Dong Ha to further interview the man.  I took him to the area on the river where the incident had occurred for an on-the-spot identification and explanation.  He described what the team had done and planned to do.

 Based on the precursor incidents, the battle of Dai Do Village, and the interrogation of the North Vietnamese sailor, as well as the recovery of the HAT II anti-ship mines I pieced together the following:

 North Vietnam intended to invade and capture the northern half of Quang Tri Province as part of what came to be called the May Offensive.  The plan called for a North Vietnam

 Navy special forces team to plant mines in the Cua Viet River just south of Dong Ha near Dai Do Village.  The mines were intended to sink a large supply craft as it transited a narrow channel at a bend in the river just east of Dong Ha.  This was to occur on or about 1 May.   Simultaneously, an NVA regiment was to swoop down and occupy both sides of the river at the site of the sunken boat.  They intended to hold the area and prevent supply craft from taking arms and supplies to the Marines and ARVN in Dong Ha.  Our PBR force prevented their placing the mines, thus thwarting their plan to sink a boat to block the river. 

 When the Marine platoon went to the area where I had reported the activity on the north bank of the river, they encountered the NVA regiment.  Because of the lack of communication between the NVA regiment and the navy special forces mining team, the NVA did not know that the mining of the river had not occurred as planned.  Therefore, they marched across the DMZ and met our Marines at Dai Do Village.  The combined US and ARVN forces that responded to the NVA incursion successfully thwarted the NVA’s plans and pushed them back across the DMZ.  That came to be known as The Battle of Dai Do Village.

 One can only speculate what course the war may have taken had the NVA been successful in capturing the northern half of Quang Tri Province.  The lives of the sailors and marines at Cua Viet and Dong Ha certainly would have been adversely affected.

 The preceding is accurate to the best of my memory and my notes in my personal log covering that time period.

 
Herman Woodrow Hughes
CAPTAIN, US Naval Reserve (Retired)